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//! This module contains the implementation of the polynomial commitment scheme
//! called the Inner Product Argument (IPA) as described in [Efficient
//! Zero-Knowledge Arguments for Arithmetic Circuits in the Discrete Log
//! Setting](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/263)
use crate::{
commitment::{
b_poly, b_poly_coefficients, combine_commitments, shift_scalar, squeeze_challenge,
squeeze_prechallenge, BatchEvaluationProof, CommitmentCurve, EndoCurve,
},
error::CommitmentError,
hash_map_cache::HashMapCache,
utils::combine_polys,
BlindedCommitment, PolyComm, PolynomialsToCombine, SRS as SRSTrait,
};
use ark_ec::{AffineRepr, CurveGroup, VariableBaseMSM};
use ark_ff::{BigInteger, Field, One, PrimeField, UniformRand, Zero};
use ark_poly::{
univariate::DensePolynomial, EvaluationDomain, Evaluations, Radix2EvaluationDomain as D,
};
use ark_serialize::{CanonicalDeserialize, CanonicalSerialize};
use blake2::{Blake2b512, Digest};
use groupmap::GroupMap;
use mina_poseidon::{sponge::ScalarChallenge, FqSponge};
use o1_utils::{
field_helpers::{inner_prod, pows},
math,
};
use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
use rayon::prelude::*;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_with::serde_as;
use std::{cmp::min, iter::Iterator, ops::AddAssign};
#[serde_as]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(bound = "G: CanonicalDeserialize + CanonicalSerialize")]
pub struct SRS<G> {
/// The vector of group elements for committing to polynomials in
/// coefficient form.
#[serde_as(as = "Vec<o1_utils::serialization::SerdeAs>")]
pub g: Vec<G>,
/// A group element used for blinding commitments
#[serde_as(as = "o1_utils::serialization::SerdeAs")]
pub h: G,
// TODO: the following field should be separated, as they are optimization
// values
/// Commitments to Lagrange bases, per domain size
#[serde(skip)]
pub lagrange_bases: HashMapCache<usize, Vec<PolyComm<G>>>,
}
impl<G> PartialEq for SRS<G>
where
G: PartialEq,
{
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.g == other.g && self.h == other.h
}
}
pub fn endos<G: CommitmentCurve>() -> (G::BaseField, G::ScalarField)
where
G::BaseField: PrimeField,
{
let endo_q: G::BaseField = mina_poseidon::sponge::endo_coefficient();
let endo_r = {
let potential_endo_r: G::ScalarField = mina_poseidon::sponge::endo_coefficient();
let t = G::generator();
let (x, y) = t.to_coordinates().unwrap();
let phi_t = G::of_coordinates(x * endo_q, y);
if t.mul(potential_endo_r) == phi_t.into_group() {
potential_endo_r
} else {
potential_endo_r * potential_endo_r
}
};
(endo_q, endo_r)
}
fn point_of_random_bytes<G: CommitmentCurve>(map: &G::Map, random_bytes: &[u8]) -> G
where
G::BaseField: Field,
{
// packing in bit-representation
const N: usize = 31;
let extension_degree = G::BaseField::extension_degree() as usize;
let mut base_fields = Vec::with_capacity(N * extension_degree);
for base_count in 0..extension_degree {
let mut bits = [false; 8 * N];
let offset = base_count * N;
for i in 0..N {
for j in 0..8 {
bits[8 * i + j] = (random_bytes[offset + i] >> j) & 1 == 1;
}
}
let n =
<<G::BaseField as Field>::BasePrimeField as PrimeField>::BigInt::from_bits_be(&bits);
let t = <<G::BaseField as Field>::BasePrimeField as PrimeField>::from_bigint(n)
.expect("packing code has a bug");
base_fields.push(t)
}
let t = G::BaseField::from_base_prime_field_elems(&base_fields).unwrap();
let (x, y) = map.to_group(t);
G::of_coordinates(x, y).mul_by_cofactor()
}
/// Additional methods for the SRS structure
impl<G: CommitmentCurve> SRS<G> {
/// This function verifies a batch of polynomial commitment opening proofs.
/// Return `true` if the verification is successful, `false` otherwise.
pub fn verify<EFqSponge, RNG>(
&self,
group_map: &G::Map,
batch: &mut [BatchEvaluationProof<G, EFqSponge, OpeningProof<G>>],
rng: &mut RNG,
) -> bool
where
EFqSponge: FqSponge<G::BaseField, G, G::ScalarField>,
RNG: RngCore + CryptoRng,
G::BaseField: PrimeField,
{
// Verifier checks for all i,
// c_i Q_i + delta_i = z1_i (G_i + b_i U_i) + z2_i H
//
// if we sample evalscale at random, it suffices to check
//
// 0 == sum_i evalscale^i (c_i Q_i + delta_i - ( z1_i (G_i + b_i U_i) + z2_i H ))
//
// and because each G_i is a multiexp on the same array self.g, we
// can batch the multiexp across proofs.
//
// So for each proof in the batch, we add onto our big multiexp the following terms
// evalscale^i c_i Q_i
// evalscale^i delta_i
// - (evalscale^i z1_i) G_i
// - (evalscale^i z2_i) H
// - (evalscale^i z1_i b_i) U_i
// We also check that the sg component of the proof is equal to the polynomial commitment
// to the "s" array
let nonzero_length = self.g.len();
let max_rounds = math::ceil_log2(nonzero_length);
let padded_length = 1 << max_rounds;
let (_, endo_r) = endos::<G>();
// TODO: This will need adjusting
let padding = padded_length - nonzero_length;
let mut points = vec![self.h];
points.extend(self.g.clone());
points.extend(vec![G::zero(); padding]);
let mut scalars = vec![G::ScalarField::zero(); padded_length + 1];
assert_eq!(scalars.len(), points.len());
// sample randomiser to scale the proofs with
let rand_base = G::ScalarField::rand(rng);
let sg_rand_base = G::ScalarField::rand(rng);
let mut rand_base_i = G::ScalarField::one();
let mut sg_rand_base_i = G::ScalarField::one();
for BatchEvaluationProof {
sponge,
evaluation_points,
polyscale,
evalscale,
evaluations,
opening,
combined_inner_product,
} in batch.iter_mut()
{
sponge.absorb_fr(&[shift_scalar::<G>(*combined_inner_product)]);
let u_base: G = {
let t = sponge.challenge_fq();
let (x, y) = group_map.to_group(t);
G::of_coordinates(x, y)
};
let Challenges { chal, chal_inv } = opening.challenges::<EFqSponge>(&endo_r, sponge);
sponge.absorb_g(&[opening.delta]);
let c = ScalarChallenge(sponge.challenge()).to_field(&endo_r);
// < s, sum_i evalscale^i pows(evaluation_point[i]) >
// ==
// sum_i evalscale^i < s, pows(evaluation_point[i]) >
let b0 = {
let mut scale = G::ScalarField::one();
let mut res = G::ScalarField::zero();
for &e in evaluation_points.iter() {
let term = b_poly(&chal, e);
res += &(scale * term);
scale *= *evalscale;
}
res
};
let s = b_poly_coefficients(&chal);
let neg_rand_base_i = -rand_base_i;
// TERM
// - rand_base_i z1 G
//
// we also add -sg_rand_base_i * G to check correctness of sg.
points.push(opening.sg);
scalars.push(neg_rand_base_i * opening.z1 - sg_rand_base_i);
// Here we add
// sg_rand_base_i * ( < s, self.g > )
// =
// < sg_rand_base_i s, self.g >
//
// to check correctness of the sg component.
{
let terms: Vec<_> = s.par_iter().map(|s| sg_rand_base_i * s).collect();
for (i, term) in terms.iter().enumerate() {
scalars[i + 1] += term;
}
}
// TERM
// - rand_base_i * z2 * H
scalars[0] -= &(rand_base_i * opening.z2);
// TERM
// -rand_base_i * (z1 * b0 * U)
scalars.push(neg_rand_base_i * (opening.z1 * b0));
points.push(u_base);
// TERM
// rand_base_i c_i Q_i
// = rand_base_i c_i
// (sum_j (chal_invs[j] L_j + chals[j] R_j) + P_prime)
// where P_prime = combined commitment + combined_inner_product * U
let rand_base_i_c_i = c * rand_base_i;
for ((l, r), (u_inv, u)) in opening.lr.iter().zip(chal_inv.iter().zip(chal.iter())) {
points.push(*l);
scalars.push(rand_base_i_c_i * u_inv);
points.push(*r);
scalars.push(rand_base_i_c_i * u);
}
// TERM
// sum_j evalscale^j (sum_i polyscale^i f_i) (elm_j)
// == sum_j sum_i evalscale^j polyscale^i f_i(elm_j)
// == sum_i polyscale^i sum_j evalscale^j f_i(elm_j)
combine_commitments(
evaluations,
&mut scalars,
&mut points,
*polyscale,
rand_base_i_c_i,
);
scalars.push(rand_base_i_c_i * *combined_inner_product);
points.push(u_base);
scalars.push(rand_base_i);
points.push(opening.delta);
rand_base_i *= &rand_base;
sg_rand_base_i *= &sg_rand_base;
}
// verify the equation
let scalars: Vec<_> = scalars.iter().map(|x| x.into_bigint()).collect();
G::Group::msm_bigint(&points, &scalars) == G::Group::zero()
}
/// This function creates a trusted-setup SRS instance for circuits with
/// number of rows up to `depth`.
///
/// # Safety
///
/// This function is unsafe because it creates a trusted setup and the toxic
/// waste is passed as a parameter.
pub unsafe fn create_trusted_setup(x: G::ScalarField, depth: usize) -> Self {
let m = G::Map::setup();
let mut x_pow = G::ScalarField::one();
let g: Vec<_> = (0..depth)
.map(|_| {
let res = G::generator().mul(x_pow);
x_pow *= x;
res.into_affine()
})
.collect();
// Compute a blinder
let h = {
let mut h = Blake2b512::new();
h.update("srs_misc".as_bytes());
// FIXME: This is for retrocompatibility with a previous version
// that was using a list initialisation. It is not necessary.
h.update(0_u32.to_be_bytes());
point_of_random_bytes(&m, &h.finalize())
};
Self {
g,
h,
lagrange_bases: HashMapCache::new(),
}
}
}
impl<G: CommitmentCurve> SRS<G>
where
<G as CommitmentCurve>::Map: Sync,
G::BaseField: PrimeField,
{
/// This function creates SRS instance for circuits with number of rows up
/// to `depth`.
pub fn create_parallel(depth: usize) -> Self {
let m = G::Map::setup();
let g: Vec<_> = (0..depth)
.into_par_iter()
.map(|i| {
let mut h = Blake2b512::new();
h.update((i as u32).to_be_bytes());
point_of_random_bytes(&m, &h.finalize())
})
.collect();
// Compute a blinder
let h = {
let mut h = Blake2b512::new();
h.update("srs_misc".as_bytes());
// FIXME: This is for retrocompatibility with a previous version
// that was using a list initialisation. It is not necessary.
h.update(0_u32.to_be_bytes());
point_of_random_bytes(&m, &h.finalize())
};
Self {
g,
h,
lagrange_bases: HashMapCache::new(),
}
}
}
impl<G> SRSTrait<G> for SRS<G>
where
G: CommitmentCurve,
{
/// The maximum polynomial degree that can be committed to
fn max_poly_size(&self) -> usize {
self.g.len()
}
fn blinding_commitment(&self) -> G {
self.h
}
/// Turns a non-hiding polynomial commitment into a hidding polynomial
/// commitment. Transforms each given `<a, G>` into `(<a, G> + wH, w)` with
/// a random `w` per commitment.
fn mask(
&self,
comm: PolyComm<G>,
rng: &mut (impl RngCore + CryptoRng),
) -> BlindedCommitment<G> {
let blinders = comm.map(|_| G::ScalarField::rand(rng));
self.mask_custom(comm, &blinders).unwrap()
}
fn mask_custom(
&self,
com: PolyComm<G>,
blinders: &PolyComm<G::ScalarField>,
) -> Result<BlindedCommitment<G>, CommitmentError> {
let commitment = com
.zip(blinders)
.ok_or_else(|| CommitmentError::BlindersDontMatch(blinders.len(), com.len()))?
.map(|(g, b)| {
let mut g_masked = self.h.mul(b);
g_masked.add_assign(&g);
g_masked.into_affine()
});
Ok(BlindedCommitment {
commitment,
blinders: blinders.clone(),
})
}
fn commit_non_hiding(
&self,
plnm: &DensePolynomial<G::ScalarField>,
num_chunks: usize,
) -> PolyComm<G> {
let is_zero = plnm.is_zero();
let coeffs: Vec<_> = plnm.iter().map(|c| c.into_bigint()).collect();
// chunk while commiting
let mut chunks = vec![];
if is_zero {
chunks.push(G::zero());
} else {
coeffs.chunks(self.g.len()).for_each(|coeffs_chunk| {
let chunk = G::Group::msm_bigint(&self.g, coeffs_chunk);
chunks.push(chunk.into_affine());
});
}
for _ in chunks.len()..num_chunks {
chunks.push(G::zero());
}
PolyComm::<G>::new(chunks)
}
fn commit(
&self,
plnm: &DensePolynomial<G::ScalarField>,
num_chunks: usize,
rng: &mut (impl RngCore + CryptoRng),
) -> BlindedCommitment<G> {
self.mask(self.commit_non_hiding(plnm, num_chunks), rng)
}
fn commit_custom(
&self,
plnm: &DensePolynomial<G::ScalarField>,
num_chunks: usize,
blinders: &PolyComm<G::ScalarField>,
) -> Result<BlindedCommitment<G>, CommitmentError> {
self.mask_custom(self.commit_non_hiding(plnm, num_chunks), blinders)
}
fn commit_evaluations_non_hiding(
&self,
domain: D<G::ScalarField>,
plnm: &Evaluations<G::ScalarField, D<G::ScalarField>>,
) -> PolyComm<G> {
let basis = self.get_lagrange_basis(domain);
let commit_evaluations = |evals: &Vec<G::ScalarField>, basis: &Vec<PolyComm<G>>| {
PolyComm::<G>::multi_scalar_mul(&basis.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()[..], &evals[..])
};
match domain.size.cmp(&plnm.domain().size) {
std::cmp::Ordering::Less => {
let s = (plnm.domain().size / domain.size) as usize;
let v: Vec<_> = (0..(domain.size())).map(|i| plnm.evals[s * i]).collect();
commit_evaluations(&v, basis)
}
std::cmp::Ordering::Equal => commit_evaluations(&plnm.evals, basis),
std::cmp::Ordering::Greater => {
panic!("desired commitment domain size ({}) greater than evaluations' domain size ({}):", domain.size, plnm.domain().size)
}
}
}
fn commit_evaluations(
&self,
domain: D<G::ScalarField>,
plnm: &Evaluations<G::ScalarField, D<G::ScalarField>>,
rng: &mut (impl RngCore + CryptoRng),
) -> BlindedCommitment<G> {
self.mask(self.commit_evaluations_non_hiding(domain, plnm), rng)
}
fn commit_evaluations_custom(
&self,
domain: D<G::ScalarField>,
plnm: &Evaluations<G::ScalarField, D<G::ScalarField>>,
blinders: &PolyComm<G::ScalarField>,
) -> Result<BlindedCommitment<G>, CommitmentError> {
self.mask_custom(self.commit_evaluations_non_hiding(domain, plnm), blinders)
}
fn create(depth: usize) -> Self {
let m = G::Map::setup();
let g: Vec<_> = (0..depth)
.map(|i| {
let mut h = Blake2b512::new();
h.update((i as u32).to_be_bytes());
point_of_random_bytes(&m, &h.finalize())
})
.collect();
// Compute a blinder
let h = {
let mut h = Blake2b512::new();
h.update("srs_misc".as_bytes());
// FIXME: This is for retrocompatibility with a previous version
// that was using a list initialisation. It is not necessary.
h.update(0_u32.to_be_bytes());
point_of_random_bytes(&m, &h.finalize())
};
Self {
g,
h,
lagrange_bases: HashMapCache::new(),
}
}
fn get_lagrange_basis_from_domain_size(&self, domain_size: usize) -> &Vec<PolyComm<G>> {
self.lagrange_bases.get_or_generate(domain_size, || {
self.lagrange_basis(D::new(domain_size).unwrap())
})
}
fn get_lagrange_basis(&self, domain: D<G::ScalarField>) -> &Vec<PolyComm<G>> {
self.lagrange_bases
.get_or_generate(domain.size(), || self.lagrange_basis(domain))
}
fn size(&self) -> usize {
self.g.len()
}
}
impl<G: CommitmentCurve> SRS<G> {
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
#[allow(clippy::many_single_char_names)]
// NB: a slight modification to the original protocol is done when absorbing
// the first prover message to improve the efficiency in a recursive
// setting.
pub fn open<EFqSponge, RNG, D: EvaluationDomain<G::ScalarField>>(
&self,
group_map: &G::Map,
plnms: PolynomialsToCombine<G, D>,
elm: &[G::ScalarField],
polyscale: G::ScalarField,
evalscale: G::ScalarField,
mut sponge: EFqSponge,
rng: &mut RNG,
) -> OpeningProof<G>
where
EFqSponge: Clone + FqSponge<G::BaseField, G, G::ScalarField>,
RNG: RngCore + CryptoRng,
G::BaseField: PrimeField,
G: EndoCurve,
{
let (endo_q, endo_r) = endos::<G>();
let rounds = math::ceil_log2(self.g.len());
let padded_length = 1 << rounds;
// TODO: Trim this to the degree of the largest polynomial
// TODO: We do always suppose we have a power of 2 for the SRS in
// practice. Therefore, padding equals zero, and this code can be
// removed. Only a current test case uses a SRS with a non-power of 2.
let padding = padded_length - self.g.len();
let mut g = self.g.clone();
g.extend(vec![G::zero(); padding]);
// Combines polynomials roughly as follows: p(X) := ∑_i polyscale^i p_i(X)
//
// `blinding_factor` is a combined set of commitments that are
// paired with polynomials in `plnms`. In kimchi, these input commitments
// are poly com blinders, so often `[G::ScalarField::one(); num_chunks]` or zeroes.
let (p, blinding_factor) = combine_polys::<G, D>(plnms, polyscale, self.g.len());
// The initial evaluation vector for polynomial commitment b_init is not
// just the powers of a single point as in the original IPA (1,ζ,ζ^2,...)
//
// but rather a vector of linearly combined powers with `evalscale` as recombiner.
//
// b_init[j] = Σ_i evalscale^i elm_i^j
// = ζ^j + evalscale * ζ^j ω^j (in the specific case of challenges (ζ,ζω))
//
// So in our case b_init is the following vector:
// 1 + evalscale
// ζ + evalscale * ζ ω
// ζ^2 + evalscale * (ζ ω)^2
// ζ^3 + evalscale * (ζ ω)^3
// ...
let b_init = {
// randomise/scale the eval powers
let mut scale = G::ScalarField::one();
let mut res: Vec<G::ScalarField> =
(0..padded_length).map(|_| G::ScalarField::zero()).collect();
for e in elm {
for (i, t) in pows(padded_length, *e).iter().enumerate() {
res[i] += &(scale * t);
}
scale *= &evalscale;
}
res
};
// Combined polynomial p(X) evaluated at the combined eval point b_init.
let combined_inner_product = p
.coeffs
.iter()
.zip(b_init.iter())
.map(|(a, b)| *a * b)
.fold(G::ScalarField::zero(), |acc, x| acc + x);
// Usually, the prover sends `combined_inner_product`` to the verifier
// So we should absorb `combined_inner_product``
// However it is more efficient in the recursion circuit
// to absorb a slightly modified version of it.
// As a reminder, in a recursive setting, the challenges are given as a public input
// and verified in the next iteration.
// See the `shift_scalar`` doc.
sponge.absorb_fr(&[shift_scalar::<G>(combined_inner_product)]);
// Generate another randomisation base U; our commitments will be w.r.t bases {G_i},H,U.
let u_base: G = {
let t = sponge.challenge_fq();
let (x, y) = group_map.to_group(t);
G::of_coordinates(x, y)
};
let mut a = p.coeffs;
assert!(padded_length >= a.len());
a.extend(vec![G::ScalarField::zero(); padded_length - a.len()]);
let mut b = b_init;
let mut lr = vec![];
let mut blinders = vec![];
let mut chals = vec![];
let mut chal_invs = vec![];
// The main IPA folding loop that has log iterations.
for _ in 0..rounds {
let n = g.len() / 2;
// Pedersen bases
let (g_lo, g_hi) = (&g[0..n], &g[n..]);
// Polynomial coefficients
let (a_lo, a_hi) = (&a[0..n], &a[n..]);
// Evaluation points
let (b_lo, b_hi) = (&b[0..n], &b[n..]);
// Blinders for L/R
let rand_l = <G::ScalarField as UniformRand>::rand(rng);
let rand_r = <G::ScalarField as UniformRand>::rand(rng);
// Pedersen commitment to a_lo,rand_l,<a_hi,b_lo>
let l = G::Group::msm_bigint(
&[g_lo, &[self.h, u_base]].concat(),
&[a_hi, &[rand_l, inner_prod(a_hi, b_lo)]]
.concat()
.iter()
.map(|x| x.into_bigint())
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
)
.into_affine();
let r = G::Group::msm_bigint(
&[g_hi, &[self.h, u_base]].concat(),
&[a_lo, &[rand_r, inner_prod(a_lo, b_hi)]]
.concat()
.iter()
.map(|x| x.into_bigint())
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
)
.into_affine();
lr.push((l, r));
blinders.push((rand_l, rand_r));
sponge.absorb_g(&[l]);
sponge.absorb_g(&[r]);
// Round #i challenges;
// - not to be confused with "u_base"
// - not to be confused with "u" as "polyscale"
let u_pre = squeeze_prechallenge(&mut sponge);
let u = u_pre.to_field(&endo_r);
let u_inv = u.inverse().unwrap();
chals.push(u);
chal_invs.push(u_inv);
// IPA-folding polynomial coefficients
a = a_hi
.par_iter()
.zip(a_lo)
.map(|(&hi, &lo)| {
// lo + u_inv * hi
let mut res = hi;
res *= u_inv;
res += &lo;
res
})
.collect();
// IPA-folding evaluation points
b = b_lo
.par_iter()
.zip(b_hi)
.map(|(&lo, &hi)| {
// lo + u * hi
let mut res = hi;
res *= u;
res += &lo;
res
})
.collect();
// IPA-folding bases
g = G::combine_one_endo(endo_r, endo_q, g_lo, g_hi, u_pre);
}
assert!(
g.len() == 1 && a.len() == 1 && b.len() == 1,
"IPA commitment folding must produce single elements after log rounds"
);
let a0 = a[0];
let b0 = b[0];
let g0 = g[0];
// Compute r_prime, a folded blinder. It combines blinders on
// each individual step of the IPA folding process together
// with the final blinding_factor of the polynomial.
//
// r_prime := ∑_i (rand_l[i] * u[i]^{-1} + rand_r * u[i])
// + blinding_factor
//
// where u is a vector of folding challenges, and rand_l/rand_r are
// intermediate L/R blinders.
let r_prime = blinders
.iter()
.zip(chals.iter().zip(chal_invs.iter()))
.map(|((rand_l, rand_r), (u, u_inv))| ((*rand_l) * u_inv) + (*rand_r * u))
.fold(blinding_factor, |acc, x| acc + x);
let d = <G::ScalarField as UniformRand>::rand(rng);
let r_delta = <G::ScalarField as UniformRand>::rand(rng);
// Compute delta, the commitment
// delta = [d] G0 + [b0*d] U_base + [r_delta] H^r (as a group element, in additive notation)
let delta = ((g0.into_group() + (u_base.mul(b0))).into_affine().mul(d)
+ self.h.mul(r_delta))
.into_affine();
sponge.absorb_g(&[delta]);
let c = ScalarChallenge(sponge.challenge()).to_field(&endo_r);
// (?) Schnorr-like responses showing the knowledge of r_prime and a0.
let z1 = a0 * c + d;
let z2 = r_prime * c + r_delta;
OpeningProof {
delta,
lr,
z1,
z2,
sg: g0,
}
}
fn lagrange_basis(&self, domain: D<G::ScalarField>) -> Vec<PolyComm<G>> {
let n = domain.size();
// Let V be a vector space over the field F.
//
// Given
// - a domain [ 1, w, w^2, ..., w^{n - 1} ]
// - a vector v := [ v_0, ..., v_{n - 1} ] in V^n
//
// the FFT algorithm computes the matrix application
//
// u = M(w) * v
//
// where
// M(w) =
// 1 1 1 ... 1
// 1 w w^2 ... w^{n-1}
// ...
// 1 w^{n-1} (w^2)^{n-1} ... (w^{n-1})^{n-1}
//
// The IFFT algorithm computes
//
// v = M(w)^{-1} * u
//
// Let's see how we can use this algorithm to compute the lagrange basis
// commitments.
//
// Let V be the vector space F[x] of polynomials in x over F.
// Let v in V be the vector [ L_0, ..., L_{n - 1} ] where L_i is the i^{th}
// normalized Lagrange polynomial (where L_i(w^j) = j == i ? 1 : 0).
//
// Consider the rows of M(w) * v. Let me write out the matrix and vector so you
// can see more easily.
//
// | 1 1 1 ... 1 | | L_0 |
// | 1 w w^2 ... w^{n-1} | * | L_1 |
// | ... | | ... |
// | 1 w^{n-1} (w^2)^{n-1} ... (w^{n-1})^{n-1} | | L_{n-1} |
//
// The 0th row is L_0 + L1 + ... + L_{n - 1}. So, it's the polynomial
// that has the value 1 on every element of the domain.
// In other words, it's the polynomial 1.
//
// The 1st row is L_0 + w L_1 + ... + w^{n - 1} L_{n - 1}. So, it's the
// polynomial which has value w^i on w^i.
// In other words, it's the polynomial x.
//
// In general, you can see that row i is in fact the polynomial x^i.
//
// Thus, M(w) * v is the vector u, where u = [ 1, x, x^2, ..., x^n ]
//
// Therefore, the IFFT algorithm, when applied to the vector u (the standard
// monomial basis) will yield the vector v of the (normalized) Lagrange polynomials.
//
// Now, because the polynomial commitment scheme is additively homomorphic, and
// because the commitment to the polynomial x^i is just self.g[i], we can obtain
// commitments to the normalized Lagrange polynomials by applying IFFT to the
// vector self.g[0..n].
//
//
// Further still, we can do the same trick for 'chunked' polynomials.
//
// Recall that a chunked polynomial is some f of degree k*n - 1 with
// f(x) = f_0(x) + x^n f_1(x) + ... + x^{(k-1) n} f_{k-1}(x)
// where each f_i has degree n-1.
//
// In the above, if we set u = [ 1, x^2, ... x^{n-1}, 0, 0, .., 0 ]
// then we effectively 'zero out' any polynomial terms higher than x^{n-1}, leaving
// us with the 'partial Lagrange polynomials' that contribute to f_0.
//
// Similarly, u = [ 0, 0, ..., 0, 1, x^2, ..., x^{n-1}, 0, 0, ..., 0] with n leading
// zeros 'zeroes out' all terms except the 'partial Lagrange polynomials' that
// contribute to f_1, and likewise for each f_i.
//
// By computing each of these, and recollecting the terms as a vector of polynomial
// commitments, we obtain a chunked commitment to the L_i polynomials.
let srs_size = self.g.len();
let num_elems = (n + srs_size - 1) / srs_size;
let mut chunks = Vec::with_capacity(num_elems);
// For each chunk
for i in 0..num_elems {
// Initialize the vector with zero curve points
let mut lg: Vec<<G as AffineRepr>::Group> = vec![<G as AffineRepr>::Group::zero(); n];
// Overwrite the terms corresponding to that chunk with the SRS curve points
let start_offset = i * srs_size;
let num_terms = min((i + 1) * srs_size, n) - start_offset;
for j in 0..num_terms {
lg[start_offset + j] = self.g[j].into_group()
}
// Apply the IFFT
domain.ifft_in_place(&mut lg);
// Append the 'partial Langrange polynomials' to the vector of elems chunks
chunks.push(<G as AffineRepr>::Group::normalize_batch(lg.as_mut_slice()));
}
(0..n)
.map(|i| PolyComm {
chunks: chunks.iter().map(|v| v[i]).collect(),
})
.collect()
}
}
#[serde_as]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Default, PartialEq)]
#[serde(bound = "G: ark_serialize::CanonicalDeserialize + ark_serialize::CanonicalSerialize")]
pub struct OpeningProof<G: AffineRepr> {
/// Vector of rounds of L & R commitments
#[serde_as(as = "Vec<(o1_utils::serialization::SerdeAs, o1_utils::serialization::SerdeAs)>")]
pub lr: Vec<(G, G)>,
#[serde_as(as = "o1_utils::serialization::SerdeAs")]
pub delta: G,
#[serde_as(as = "o1_utils::serialization::SerdeAs")]
pub z1: G::ScalarField,
#[serde_as(as = "o1_utils::serialization::SerdeAs")]
pub z2: G::ScalarField,
/// A final folded commitment base
#[serde_as(as = "o1_utils::serialization::SerdeAs")]
pub sg: G,
}
impl<BaseField: PrimeField, G: AffineRepr<BaseField = BaseField> + CommitmentCurve + EndoCurve>
crate::OpenProof<G> for OpeningProof<G>
{
type SRS = SRS<G>;
fn open<EFqSponge, RNG, D: EvaluationDomain<<G as AffineRepr>::ScalarField>>(
srs: &Self::SRS,
group_map: &<G as CommitmentCurve>::Map,
plnms: PolynomialsToCombine<G, D>,
elm: &[<G as AffineRepr>::ScalarField], // vector of evaluation points
polyscale: <G as AffineRepr>::ScalarField, // scaling factor for polynoms
evalscale: <G as AffineRepr>::ScalarField, // scaling factor for evaluation point powers
sponge: EFqSponge, // sponge
rng: &mut RNG,
) -> Self
where
EFqSponge:
Clone + FqSponge<<G as AffineRepr>::BaseField, G, <G as AffineRepr>::ScalarField>,
RNG: RngCore + CryptoRng,
{
srs.open(group_map, plnms, elm, polyscale, evalscale, sponge, rng)
}
fn verify<EFqSponge, RNG>(
srs: &Self::SRS,
group_map: &G::Map,
batch: &mut [BatchEvaluationProof<G, EFqSponge, Self>],
rng: &mut RNG,
) -> bool
where
EFqSponge: FqSponge<<G as AffineRepr>::BaseField, G, <G as AffineRepr>::ScalarField>,
RNG: RngCore + CryptoRng,
{
srs.verify(group_map, batch, rng)
}
}
/// Commitment round challenges (endo mapped) and their inverses.
pub struct Challenges<F> {
pub chal: Vec<F>,
pub chal_inv: Vec<F>,
}
impl<G: AffineRepr> OpeningProof<G> {
/// Computes a log-sized vector of scalar challenges for
/// recombining elements inside the IPA.
pub fn prechallenges<EFqSponge: FqSponge<G::BaseField, G, G::ScalarField>>(
&self,
sponge: &mut EFqSponge,
) -> Vec<ScalarChallenge<G::ScalarField>> {
let _t = sponge.challenge_fq();
self.lr
.iter()
.map(|(l, r)| {
sponge.absorb_g(&[*l]);
sponge.absorb_g(&[*r]);
squeeze_prechallenge(sponge)
})
.collect()
}
/// Same as `prechallenges`, but maps scalar challenges using the
/// provided endomorphism, and computes their inverses.
pub fn challenges<EFqSponge: FqSponge<G::BaseField, G, G::ScalarField>>(
&self,
endo_r: &G::ScalarField,
sponge: &mut EFqSponge,
) -> Challenges<G::ScalarField> {
let chal: Vec<_> = self
.lr
.iter()
.map(|(l, r)| {
sponge.absorb_g(&[*l]);
sponge.absorb_g(&[*r]);
squeeze_challenge(endo_r, sponge)
})
.collect();
let chal_inv = {
let mut cs = chal.clone();
ark_ff::batch_inversion(&mut cs);
cs
};
Challenges { chal, chal_inv }
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "ocaml_types")]
pub mod caml {
use super::OpeningProof;
use ark_ec::AffineRepr;
use ocaml;
#[derive(ocaml::IntoValue, ocaml::FromValue, ocaml_gen::Struct)]
pub struct CamlOpeningProof<G, F> {
/// vector of rounds of L & R commitments
pub lr: Vec<(G, G)>,
pub delta: G,
pub z1: F,
pub z2: F,
pub sg: G,
}
impl<G, CamlF, CamlG> From<OpeningProof<G>> for CamlOpeningProof<CamlG, CamlF>
where
G: AffineRepr,
CamlG: From<G>,
CamlF: From<G::ScalarField>,
{
fn from(opening_proof: OpeningProof<G>) -> Self {
Self {
lr: opening_proof
.lr
.into_iter()
.map(|(g1, g2)| (CamlG::from(g1), CamlG::from(g2)))
.collect(),
delta: CamlG::from(opening_proof.delta),
z1: opening_proof.z1.into(),
z2: opening_proof.z2.into(),
sg: CamlG::from(opening_proof.sg),
}
}
}
impl<G, CamlF, CamlG> From<CamlOpeningProof<CamlG, CamlF>> for OpeningProof<G>
where
G: AffineRepr,
CamlG: Into<G>,
CamlF: Into<G::ScalarField>,
{
fn from(caml: CamlOpeningProof<CamlG, CamlF>) -> Self {
Self {
lr: caml
.lr
.into_iter()
.map(|(g1, g2)| (g1.into(), g2.into()))
.collect(),
delta: caml.delta.into(),
z1: caml.z1.into(),
z2: caml.z2.into(),
sg: caml.sg.into(),
}
}
}
}